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- remove lab/ (index.php, apache conf, up/down/status shims) - remove poc/lab.py and the 'poc lab' subcommand - proof path defaults to a fixed per-user dir so the working directory no longer matters - README: target recipe documented instead of shipped
304 lines
17 KiB
Markdown
304 lines
17 KiB
Markdown
# Grounding — CVE-2026-109618 / CVE-2026-109619 ("php2shell")
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All facts below were pulled from primary sources on 2026-10-24, not from PoC README prose.
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Every URL listed in §4 was actually fetched; the NVD records were parsed from the API JSON.
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## 1. Identifiers
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| Item | Value | Source |
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|---|---|---|
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| CVE-2026-109618 | "RCE via OOM corruption" | NVD 2.0, `vulnStatus: Analyzed`, published 2026-10-21T14:17:09 |
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| CVE-2026-109619 | "RCE via stale global state" | NVD 2.0, `vulnStatus: Analyzed`, published 2026-10-21T14:17:09 |
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| Vendor advisory 109618 | GHSA-w8hw-w9fx-j79w (php-src), critical | GitHub Security Advisory API |
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| Vendor advisory 109619 | GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp (php-src), critical | GitHub Security Advisory API |
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| CNA | PHP Group (`[email protected]`), assigner short name `php` | cveawg.mitre.org API |
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| CVSS | 4.0 = 9.2 `AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H`; NVD 3.1 = 9.8 `AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H` | NVD metrics |
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| CWE | 416 (UAF), 755 (improper handling of exceptional conditions), 824 (access of uninitialized pointer), 1325 (improperly controlled sequential memory allocation), 1419 (incorrect initialization of resource) | NVD weaknesses |
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| CAPEC | CAPEC-234 hijacking a privileged process | CVE record `impacts` |
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## 2. Affected versions (from NVD `cpeMatch`, not from prose)
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CVE-2026-109618:
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| Range | Fixed |
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|---|---|
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| 7.3.0 ≤ v < 8.2.35 | 8.2.35 |
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| 8.3.0 ≤ v < 8.3.36 | 8.3.36 |
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| 8.4.0 ≤ v < 8.4.27 | 8.4.27 |
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| 8.5.0 ≤ v < 8.5.12 | 8.5.12 |
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CVE-2026-109619: same upper bounds, lower bound `5.4.0` for the 8.2 branch. CPE also lists
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Siemens Ruggedcom APE1808 and Palo Alto PAN-OS (both embed PHP), which is why the CVE has
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industrial/enterprise impact beyond web hosting.
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## 3. Mechanism (vendor advisories)
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### CVE-2026-109618 — OOM corruption
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PHP uses `longjmp()` to escape on out-of-memory. Some contexts make request memory reachable
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before it is fully initialized; if an allocation fails there, PHP does not account for the early
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exit and leaves request memory invalid. The failed allocation need not be related to the invalid
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memory. Request shutdown may then read or branch on it. Documented OOM strategies that stay
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within apparent PHP limits:
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- multipart request without a usable declared content length → passes the initial `post_max_size`
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check, keeps supplying decoded body;
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- a multipart part with an unrestricted number of headers → in-memory representation costs far
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more than the wire form, so a body inside `post_max_size` still exhausts `memory_limit`;
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- empty file controls do not count toward `max_file_uploads` but still create the metadata arrays;
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nested field names multiply the generated array work.
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Susceptibility by SAPI: Apache mod_php invokes request shutdown **unconditionally**, even when
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request startup failed → application-independent, pre-auth. FPM exits the child when startup
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fails, so that sequence dies; FPM remains susceptible after successful startup but no complete
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FPM exploit was demonstrated. FrankenPHP likely mirrors mod_php. LSAPI models FPM, unvalidated.
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Patch: removes `longjmp()` for OOM, replaced by a delayed soft OOM at the next VM safe point plus
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an immediate hard OOM via `_exit()` above a second, higher threshold.
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### CVE-2026-109619 — stale global state
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Worker-retained globals (error, session, object, extension state) point into one request's memory
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and must be reset before that memory is released. Some operations run before normal
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initialization of the next request and touch state the previous request did not reset → UAF.
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Exploitation needs a **producer** (state published and left behind) and a **consumer** (an
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operation acting on it before RINIT resets it).
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Producers: fatal error abandoned mid-operation (parse/compile failure, uncaught error, `require`
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failure, `Maximum execution time exceeded`), or OOM after state was published. Nonfatal
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diagnostics during late shutdown can also repopulate error state after it was cleared.
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Confirmed consumers before normal init:
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1. **INI diagnostics** — warnings from invalid/deprecated INI applied before `php_request_startup()`
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(`auto_detect_line_endings`, `filter.default`, legacy `assert.*`, legacy session settings,
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`report_memleaks=0`, `intl.error_level`, explicit `mbstring.*`/`iconv.*`, malformed
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`memory_limit`/timeouts, `open_basedir`-rejected paths). `error_reporting`, `@`, and
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`display_errors=Off` do **not** protect. Reachable via `.htaccess` / `php_value` on mod_php, or
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`PHP_VALUE`/`PHP_ADMIN_VALUE` from a FastCGI frontend.
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2. **Session upload progress** — reaches session handling before ordinary session init, needs no
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`session_start()` call, enabled by default.
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Confirmed concrete cases: PHP 8.5 fatal-error backtrace UAF (`EG(last_fatal_error_backtrace)`,
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requires `fatal_error_backtraces`), and session upload-progress lifecycle (`BG(unserialize)` /
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`PS(id)`).
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## 4. Primitives published by Wiz (four, grouped under the two CVEs)
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1. Upload-progress **unserializer UAF** — `BG(unserialize)` left published after a fatal OOM;
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a later request consumes attacker-reclaimed memory as live bookkeeping.
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2. Remote process-**memory disclosure** — stale `PS(id)` treated as a live `zend_string`, contents
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URL-encoded into a `PHPSESSID` response cookie; works with no `session_start()` in the app.
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3. `EG(last_fatal_error_backtrace)` UAF — 8.5 only.
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4. OPcache **type confusion** — `CG(map_ptr_last)` advanced locally but published late in
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`zend_accel_script_persist()`, cross-worker slot reuse, wrong-type pointer.
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**This PoC implements 1 + 2 plus the OOM producer.** 3 and 4 are out of scope. FPM, FrankenPHP,
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and LSAPI paths are unvalidated here.
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## 5. Stage → CVE mapping (ANALYTICAL — not vendor-published)
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The vendor does not label which primitive belongs to which CVE. Our reading:
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| Stage | Role | CVE |
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|---|---|---|
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| A1 (multipart OOM at END cleanup) | producer: leaves dangling `PS(id)` / `PS(mod_data)`, `send_cookie=1` | 109618 |
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| B1 (second request URL-encodes stale `PS(id)`) | consumer: memory disclosure | 109619 |
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| A2 (cheap OOM via nested fields) | producer: leaves dangling `PS(hash_serialize_verifier)` | 109618 |
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| B2 (fake reference → fake `zend_array`) | consumer: `zend_hash_destroy` calls `pDestructor` = `zif_system` | 109619 |
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Treat this table as an explanation, not a citation.
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## 6. Sources actually used
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- `https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId=CVE-2026-109618`
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- `https://services.nvd.nist.gov/rest/json/cves/2.0?cveId=CVE-2026-109619`
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- `https://cveawg.mitre.org/api/cve/CVE-2026-109618`
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- `https://api.github.com/repos/php/php-src/security-advisories/GHSA-w8hw-w9fx-j79w`
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- `https://api.github.com/repos/php/php-src/security-advisories/GHSA-6wmf-4rv5-p3rp`
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- `https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/10/21/6` (Jakub Zelenka, PHP security team)
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- `https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/10/23/5` (Christian Fischer, Greenbone — notes
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the 7.3.0 lower bound and links CrowdStrike)
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- `https://www.wiz.io/blog/php2shell-php-rce` (four primitives)
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- `https://github.com/9bie/php2shell-bypass-aslr-exp` (reference chain + offset table; see caution below)
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## 7. Reference chain — caution
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`9bie/php2shell-bypass-aslr-exp` is the only public chain read in full (A1/B1/A2/B2 + helpers).
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It is **reference only**: not vendored, not imported, audited read-only, executed once as a
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control test (T7) to prove the lab build is compatible. Its offsets are build-bound.
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Reported by that chain, on stock `php:8.4.26-apache` + `php.ini-production`:
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A1 = chunked multipart with 860 depth-64 nested empty-file fields + 14 × 103-byte fillers +
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78 × 8 KB fields + 20 × 4 KB burners + a 4000-byte `PHP_SESSION_UPLOAD_PROGRESS`, OOM at
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END-cleanup `php_url_encode`; B1 = forged `zend_string` header (`len=0xC8000`) so `Set-Cookie`
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URL-encodes ~800 KB of following heap; A2 = 880 depth-64 nested fields + 115 short fillers;
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B2 = 384-byte fake-reference spray (500 before, 495 after) carrying a fake `zend_array`.
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## 8. Calibration record
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Captured 2026-10-24 from `lab/status.sh` on the running target.
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| field | value |
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|---|---|
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| image | php:8.4.26-apache |
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| image id / config digest | 60111400ff77 (matches the digest recorded in the upstream offsets note) |
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| libphp.so path | /usr/lib/apache2/modules/libphp.so |
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| libphp.so sha256 | `51663cf883b1223436d4c99f31dd0225735ea5573665e4242621eee7f4ee679c` — **matches profile** |
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| php version / build date | 8.4.26 NTS (mod_php), built Oct 21 2026 00:31:19 |
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| apache version | Apache/2.4.69 (Debian), prefork pinned to 1 child |
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| profile selected | `php-8.4.26-apache-trixie-amd64` |
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| ini | display_errors=Off, memory_limit=128M, post_max_size=8M, output_buffering=0, max_file_uploads=20, max_input_vars=1000, session.upload_progress.enabled=On, save_handler=files, serialize_handler=php |
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| zval_ptr_dtor offset | 0x65EB60 (to be confirmed by `poc offsets` in T6) |
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| zif_system offset | 0x465370 (same) |
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| main_bucket_count | 87 |
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| delta range | 0x1A00000–0x1F00000 |
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Result: the pulled image is byte-identical to the build the published offsets were derived
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from, so no recalibration branch was needed.
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Published reference profile for comparison (from the upstream offsets note):
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| symbol / location | x86_64 |
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|---|---|
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| `zval_ptr_dtor` | `libphp+0x65EB60` (GLOBAL) |
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| `zif_system` | `libphp+0x465370` (LOCAL — needs `.symtab`, not `.dynsym`) |
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| `zif_passthru` | `libphp+0x465380` (LOCAL) |
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| fake `zend_array` `S` | `main+0xF8398` |
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| post-A2 `hsv` | `main+0x7D720` |
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| `PS(id)` | `ps_globals+0x10` |
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| `PS(mod_data)` | `ps_globals+0x60` |
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| `PS(send_cookie)` | `ps_globals+0x15E` |
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| `PS(hash_serialize_verifier)` | `ps_globals+0x168` |
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| main-chunk fingerprint | 87 pointers inside the first 2 MiB |
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| id / libphp clusters | 7495 / 1095 pointers in the 0xC8000 window |
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| libphp − main delta | 0x1A00000–0x1F00000 |
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## 9. Scope
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Local Docker lab only. No remote hosts, no scanning, no Shodan/Censys. The artifact is a research
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harness, not a scanner.
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## 10. Host-specific finding — the pointer window must not be hardcoded to `0x7f`
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The reference chain filters leak-window qwords to `0x7F0000000000 ≤ q ≤ 0x7FFFFFFFFFFF`. On this
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host that filter rejected every real pointer and the control run failed with
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"no heap pointers in leak window". Captured offsets observed across four container starts:
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`0x7327…`, `0x7899…`, `0x7d27…` — all below `0x7f`.
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The captured window was intact, just mis-filtered. Re-classifying the same 819 208 decoded bytes
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over canonical user space (`2^36 … 2^47−1`) reproduced the documented fingerprints exactly:
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| cluster | count | meaning |
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|---|---|---|
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| `0x7d27f67aab60` | 1095 | `zval_ptr_dtor` → `libphp = value − 0x65EB60` = `0x7d27f614c000` (page-aligned) |
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| `0x7d27f3e00000` | 7495 | id chunk |
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| `0x7d27f4400000` | 87 | main chunk |
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| `0x7d27f3c00000` | 79 | neighbour chunk |
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| libphp − main | `0x1D4C000` | inside the documented `0x1A00000–0x1F00000` window |
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Two consequences for the rebuild:
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1. Widen the window to canonical user space; never assume `0x7f`.
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2. Widening admits false positives. The window's **most common** in-range qword is
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`0x0000001600000001` (1282×) — a `zend_string` header (`rc=1`, `type_info=0x16`), which
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outnumbers `zval_ptr_dtor` (1095×). A "most common qword" heuristic therefore picks the wrong
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value once the `0x7f` filter is removed. The parser instead requires
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`(candidate − dtor_offset) % 0x1000 == 0` and a count quorum, then validates
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`libphp − main` against the profile window.
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Verification of the diagnosis: the reference chain, copied to `research/control/` with **only**
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that one literal widened and nothing else changed, produced
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`uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)` on the first attempt. That is the
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control test's value — it separates "my rebuild is broken" from "the reference's assumption does
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not hold in this environment".
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## 11. Portability — never shell out to `bash` from the CLI
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On Windows, `bash` is ambiguous. Python's `shutil.which("bash")` and `CreateProcess` disagree:
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the former searches `PATH`, the latter searches the application directory, then the working
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directory, then `System32` — so from a stock PowerShell `PATH`, `bash` resolves to
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`C:\Windows\System32\bash.exe`, which is **WSL** and cannot open `C:/Users/...` paths. The failure
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surfaces as `/bin/bash: C:/…/lab/up.sh: No such file or directory` for a file that plainly exists.
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The same code worked from git-bash purely because git-bash's `PATH` put its own `usr/bin` first.
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Rule: the CLI must not depend on a shell existing or on which one wins. `poc/lab.py` calls the
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Docker CLI directly with an argument vector (no shell string, no `bash`), so the identical
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`python -m poc exploit` works from PowerShell, cmd, git-bash, zsh, and bash. Consequences that are
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easy to get wrong:
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- **Volume paths are OS-specific.** Windows needs `C:/Users/...` (forward slashes, drive letter);
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POSIX needs the path unchanged. `host_path()` converts separators only — it deliberately does
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not call `os.path.abspath`, because that maps `/srv/x` to `C:\srv\x` on Windows.
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- **`os.path.join` is host-dependent**, so it is correct to use it with a host root and wrong to
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use it with a foreign-style root in tests.
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- **The container entrypoint must not contain `CRLF`.** `INIT` is passed as one argv element to
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`/bin/sh -c`; a stray `\r` breaks it inside the container. There is a unit test for this.
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- The `lab/*.sh` files are thin shims (`exec python -m poc …`), so there is one implementation
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rather than a shell copy and a Python copy that drift apart.
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## 12. Readiness probe — socket, not `urllib`
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`docker run -d` returns before the port is forwarded. The first version of the readiness wait used
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`urllib.request.urlopen("http://127.0.0.1:<port>/index.php")` and intermittently polled for
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**4 minutes** before giving up, while a plain `socket.create_connection` reached the same port
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0.5 s after `docker run`. There is no proxy in the environment (`getproxies()` is empty), so the
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difference is `urllib`'s own machinery. The probe is now a raw socket GET whose read loop stops at
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the header terminator, with `attempts=120, delay=0.25, timeout=1.0` and a 200-status check.
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Two rules that follow:
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- Anything the exploit path does to the target should go through the same raw-socket layer the
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chain uses; mixing an HTTP client library into the control plane adds failure modes that look
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like "the target is broken".
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- A readiness loop must be tested against a real local listener (`tests/test_lab_ready.py` runs a
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throwaway socket server and asserts 200 → body, non-200 → None, closed port → fast None).
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## 13. The RCE primitive is one-shot, and connection state is irrelevant
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The payload lands as `pDestructor = zif_system` on a forged `zend_array`, invoked by
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`zend_hash_destroy` while the request shuts down. Consequences that decide what "persistence"
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can mean:
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- It executes **once per request**, inside the worker, synchronously. `system()` blocks the child
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until the command exits, so no background process is created unless the command itself forks one.
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- There is no output channel: `system()` writes to the worker's stdout, which for mod_php under
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Apache ends up in the error log, not the HTTP response. Anything you want to read must be written
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to a path you can observe — here the `/out` bind mount.
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- The forged array is consumed by the destroy pass, so a second command needs a fresh
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A1 → B1 → A2 → B2 cycle (~2 s). There is no session to resume.
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- **`Connection: close` on every request is fine.** Cross-request state that matters is the
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*worker process* (globals + heap), not the TCP connection. Keep-alive buys nothing; landing on a
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different child loses everything.
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Measured: five sequential cycles on one worker completed 5/5 with no retries, and a counter file
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in `/out` incremented 1→5. So repeated exploitation does not by itself kill the worker; the leak-only
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stage does leave it in a bad state, which is why `poc leak` followed immediately by `poc exploit`
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can need one retry.
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## 14. TLS works at the transport layer, but a reverse proxy breaks stage 2
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The wire layer originally refused `https://`. It now wraps the socket with `ssl` (`--tls`, implied
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by an `https://` url) and verifies certificates by default (`--insecure` for self-signed labs).
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Measured against an `nginx:alpine` TLS terminator in front of the same lab container
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(`proxy_http_version 1.1`, `proxy_request_buffering off`, `proxy_buffering off`,
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`Connection close`):
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| Path | A1 | B1 |
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|---|---|---|
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| direct `http://127.0.0.1:18110` | 500 (real OOM) | 200 + 819208-byte decoded cookie → chain completes, `uid=33(www-data)` |
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| through nginx over `https://` | 500 (real OOM) | Apache logs a 200 with a truncated body, then `zend_mm_heap corrupted` → child `exit signal Abort (6)`; the proxy returns `502` |
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So TLS itself is fine, and the OOM producer reaches the target over TLS. The failure is the
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second stage's *response*: the worker aborts during that request's shutdown, and a proxy cannot
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forward a response whose upstream died mid-body. A direct client reads what was already flushed
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and carries on. Practical rule: aim the chain at mod_php's own listener, not at a terminator, a
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CDN, or a load balancer. Both `Connection` modes (`""` and `close`) and buffering off were tried;
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neither changed the outcome.
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